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    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    "Always remember to pillage before you burn"
    Unknown Barbarian

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    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    APRIL 2005 - Johannesburg - South African Military History Society ...

    samilitaryhistory.org/5/05aprnl.html


    Apr 1, 2005 - The main speaker of the evening was Mr Stuart Sterzel the chairman ... of battles between the Cuito River and the Longwe river valley in Southern ... drawing the FAPLA forces across the river and into the Lomba River valley, ...
    "Always remember to pillage before you burn"
    Unknown Barbarian

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    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    Katlagter, IIRC - I have the data somewhere - the USSR was pushing $1bn a year - in the money of that time - into Angola in hardware. As you saw, economically they just couldnt afford it. Sterzel is not the only one with that view BTW. Others have expressed it as well.

    Peter, Fred Bridgland.
    Quemadmodum gladius neminem occidit: occidentis telum est.

    Seneca (4 BC - 65 AD)

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    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    Thank you Paul and WZ. The use of case histories that illustrate military tactics and strategy can be quite useful in sport psychology and work with corporates. The German Wehrmacht's Auftragstaktik (which the Americans applied as Mission Tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan) comes to mind. Of course you have to be very careful when you use case studies from our own history. I can just imagine the shit you will pick up in using the example of Quito Cuanavale and its consequences as it really happened in a workshop that include those who want to "decolonialise" history.

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    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    Thank you for posting. Interesting.


    http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/20...e-city-specter


    One cannot help but wonder who won what ( the man on the street is worse off now and fewer freedoms)

    Keep South African internal politics aside, the SA government should never settled without compensation. They should have extracted everything to cover costs at least.
    live out your imagination , not your history.

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    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    One side of the events

    Battle: Cubans Failing the Lomba (by Genl Jannie Geldenhuys)


    During the Cold War, armed conflicts went hand in hand with the intensification of psychological warfare, deceit and terror. I believe the dictators came out tops with regard to propaganda, but it often caused military underperformance because of undue political interference. The democratic politicians, by comparison, were the palookas of the propaganda war, but were less inclined to spoil military outcomes by political interference. This story illustrates these phenomena. Millions of people fell victim to the hoax of the “massacred villagers” of 1972 in Angola; and the 2005 hullabaloo over the 1989 “mass graves” in Namibia turned out to be a farce. However, those with hidden agendas used the rekindling of these past fiascos to recall another supposedly sinister happening, the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale of 1987. The anti South African/SADF propagandists claim that the whole story has never been told. They alleged that South Africa suffered a disastrous defeat including the loss of more than 1000 South African soldiers and over 40 South African fighter aircraft, and that “the generals” swept the military dust under the carpet. An instinctive response to these allegations is that anyone familiar with South Africa in the 1980s will tell you that losing more than 1000 soldiers and 40 fighter pilots in an operation would have been regarded as an absolute disaster, and hiding it would have been impossible.

    These allegations are lies! Southern Africa was one of many regions all over the world in the grip of the Cold War and caught up in the biggest propaganda atmosphere of all time. Moscow and Havana, and specifically Fidel Castro, were regarded as among the most skilful and ardent practitioners in this field. The events are publicly well documented. The Soviet Union sponsored Cuba’s overseas military adventures during the Cold War. However, the 1970s and 1980s were the prelude to events that saw the total collapse of the Soviet Union’s economic and financial capacity. At the extreme west of the Atlantic Ocean, the island of Cuba had to sustain a force of more than 52 000 troops (their own minimum figures) for military operations on the opposite side of the ocean in Angola.

    This is how it happened. During 1975 there was no smooth handover of Portuguese colonial authority to the Angolans in Angola. The MPLA], supported by Cuba and financed by the Soviet Union, grabbed power and fought against the other Angolan parties, the FNLA, America’s neglected pet, and UNITA. The latter two soon sought to resume their freedom struggle from their familiar territory, the African bush. The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA on a massive scale and with physical intervention. By comparison, South Africa’s aid to UNITA was minute. The Cubans later conceded that in 1975 they had thought that the coup would be settled, over and done with, within the year. But it didn’t happen that way – almost 15 years later they were still in Angola. The military struggles continued, but by the mid to late 1980s the Soviet Union’s economy was on its last legs. Only a short while later the world saw the pathetic Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin, in tears on television, saying words to the effect: I’m the head of state, my mother is ill – and I can’t afford to buy her medicine. The Soviet collapse was no surprise. As early as September 1979 I had predicted, “… Soviet Russia has moved so far out of its sphere of influence and area of interest that it is now running the risk of burning its fingers in Angola such as happened to the United States in Vietnam.” Cuba became desperate; it had to get out. During all those years the Cuban soldiers also faced other enemies, HIV/Aids and worse – malaria and TB.

    South African families who in any way experienced national service at that time may have a slight idea of the ordinary Cuban families’ hardships back home. Our own servicemen served for a continuous period of two years. A small percentage did one or two operational stints of about two months at a time across the border in South West Africa/Namibia during the latter half of their two years. It was quite a different matter for the Cuban soldiers, as you can imagine. They did operational service across the ocean for one to three years at a time. By the mid-1980s the Cubans had reached the end of their emotional stamina. However, as they told us later, they couldn’t leave in a rush; that may have created the impression back home that they had lost the war – after all those years, what for? During late November 1987 they approached the South African mission in New York and put out feelers about the possibility of negotiations. In the final analysis the Cubans wanted to get out of Africa, but they sorely needed a victory before doing so. So the Soviet Union came up with a plan to solve both it’s own and Cuba’s problems: the Soviets would reinforce the MPLA/Cuban forces to the absolute maximum to give them all they needed to conquer Jamba. Jamba was a place in the south-east of Angola where UNITA’s headquarters was located. It was the movement’s home base, cultural centre and capital. Historically, the onslaught on Jamba had become an annual affair, but the offensive always petered out before it reached the halfway mark. This time the Soviets would give it their all – one last go, the mother of all offensives that would end the war, once and forever.

    Thus it happened that in 1987/1988 the joint MPLA/Cuban/Soviet forces launched their final offensive. In Africa, this campaign would turn out to be Moscow and Havana’s swansong of the Cold War. And in Europe, the Berlin Wall crashed in 1989.The Cuban/MPLA forces crossed the start line near the confluence of the Cuito and Cuanavale Rivers, on their way to Jamba in the east. The Soviets provided the logistics and air support, and the Cubans the rest, including chemical warfare aid, pilots and missile support. Their intermediate objective was Mavinga. To reach it they had to cross the Lomba River. Facing this formidable offensive was a UNITA force, comprised overwhelmingly of infantry, with South Africa providing limited air support as well as artillery and armoured support under the command of Colonel Deon Ferreira. The same troops did not remain in this operation from beginning to end. We had three sets of relief troops in Angola for the duration of the campaign, but never more than 3000 at any time. This is what happened:Cuito Cuanavale →│Lomba River → Mavinga → Jamba. The offensive forces, as had happened before, didn’t get anywhere near Jamba. In fact, they never even came close to Mavinga! The offence tried to cross the Lomba River several times, over and over again at the same place, but suffered disastrous defeats every time.These were the decisive battles of the whole campaign. Squadron commander Major Hannes Nortman and his men knocked out many Russian tanks with their Ratel 90s (infantry fighting vehicles). He was one of a number of heroes to be decorated for bravery during this campaign.

    The MPLA alliance retreated westwards from whence it had come, and the last throes of the armed skirmishes took place at Tumpo, a minefield on the eastern side of Cuito Cuanavale. These clashes occurred during the UNITA and South African forces’ classical “mopping-up” phase of the operation – back at the threshold of the retreating forces’ launching pad. The Cuban and MPLA forces had set out to capture Jamba, but were defeated with catastrophic losses at the Lomba River. In retrospect, this was the turning point of the Cuban Cold War armed hostilities in Africa. The final battles were soon to follow. The Cubans faced a crisis, and Moscow had no option but to quit supporting the war. Havana needed a victory so that it could pull out of Africa with honour. To escape Fidel Castro pulled off a strategic hoax. He concocted a propaganda “victory” as a postscript. Following the failure of this offensive, he explained afterwards that his allies (the Soviets and the MPLA) had lost the war in the south-eastern region of Angola, so he feigned and claimed victory at Cuito Cuanavale, and then immediately forced international attention away from that mess towards the south-west of Angola. Here he re-assembled all the available Cuban forces he could muster from inside and outside Angola and had them redeployed in the far south-west, not far from the Atlantic Ocean – roughly the same distance away from the eastern region as Denmark is from England across the North Sea. He had hoped to assume a threatening posture vis-à-vis north-west Namibia. For all the Cubans’ trouble in the south-west they got a bloody nose. A combined army and air force operation destroyed some of their modern Soviet missile/rocket/radar systems with typical South African ingenuity, and in the end Commandant Mike Muller’s 61 Mechanical Battalion group knocked out a number of Soviet T55 tanks and 302 Cuban soldiers. That finally persuaded the Cubans to settle down nicely. They retreated northwards to a place called Techipa. This had been the last encounter, and the biggest direct encounter between Cuban and South African forces in Angola since 1976.

    Part 2 – Words:

    Cubans Singing the Blues In among the hot air of the Cold War propaganda, the MPLA issued its usual media releases of South African losses. Characteristically its claims were so wildly exaggerated that neither the public nor the troops batted an eyelid. Had their figures been true, it would have meant absolute consternation in South Africa. However, it was a joke; such “national disasters” couldn’t possibly have happened without a massive public outcry in South Africa – and the government would have tumbled, for sure. Here are a few examples of their claims:(Bulleted list) 40 SA Air Force aircraft shot down – Angop (official Angolan news agency), 22 January 1988.South Africa had lost 140 men, 6 aircraft, 47 tanks and diverse armoured cars during the previous 45 days – President Dos Santos, 19 February1988. These news bulletins were the joke of the day for some time, until they became monotonous. That was 1988, – but hold your breath! 13 May 2004! A Beeld newspaper report claims that way back in December 1987, South Africa had suffered the following losses at Cuito Cuanavale: 1230 men, 41 fighter aircraft, three helicopters and 31 combat vehicles. Thousands (!) of South African troops that had been encircled on the banks of the Cuito River had all been shot dead! These allegations had been regarded as preposterous during the 1980s. Now in 2004 (and into 2005) the plotting propagandists were using much the same figures, as if they were new revelations and worthy of serious consideration! During a radio panel discussion that started with the topic of the “secret” mass graves in Namibia, the panellists ended up by clamouring for investigations into Cuito Cuanavale. One of the panellists even asked whether it was Castro or the “generals” who were telling the truth? It seemed the PCs either wished the newspaper allegations to be true, or if they knew (as they must have done) that they were lies, they nevertheless pretended that they actually believed the statistics might just have been true, and that it was of great national importance for the public to know!
    Actual data of losses sustained in the fighting between September 1987 and April 1988 are as follows:

    Cuban/ MPLA combat losses:
    Tanks x 94
    Armoured troop and combat vehicles x 100
    BM21/BM14 MRLs x 34
    Artillery, rocket and missile systems x 15
    MiG21/23 combat aircraft x 9
    Helicopters x 9
    Personnel accounted for x 4785
    South African losses:
    Tanks x 3
    Infantry fighting vehicles x 5
    Radars x 5
    Mirage F1 fighter aircraft x 1
    Light reconnaissance aircraft x 1
    Personnel 31

    Two questions often recur: How could it be that the Soviet/MPLA/Cuban forces persisted in crossing the Lomba River, time and time again at the same place, after taking a beating each time with the same calamitous results? One possible answer is that commanders who follow Soviet teachings are inclined to make exactly that type of mistake. They tend to stick rigidly to set doctrines and patterns – if they have decided to cross at point x, they will cross at point x! (Indeed, the Soviet influence was strong. Soviet General Constantin Shaganovitch, the chemical warfare expert, was supposed to oversee a victory for his allies.) On the other hand, that approach is exactly contrary to the tactics for which the astute General Ochoa Sanchez became famous. He was the general in command of the Cuban/ MPLA forces and was known for his flexibility and unorthodox methods. He would definitely not have been in favour of hammering a classical river-crossing operation to the point of exhaustion. He was known for daring operations behind forward enemy lines. However, another possible explanation subsequently emerged: at a later date Castro established a propaganda tour for the gullible in Havana. It included a display of his planning room from where he commanded the operations at Cuito Cuanavale! Now, an arrangement whereby a politician, albeit a president, dictates operations in the field from his armchair in a planning room far away over the sea is courting disaster! This was probably the reason for the Cuban failures! On the South African side, there is no one with better first-hand knowledge of the interrelation of international military and political events during that part of the war in Angola than I. With regard to the military, the buck stopped with me. On the Cuban side there is no one with more experience and knowledge of the military course of events than General Ochoa Sanchez. He was there, the commanding general. He was a famous man of many Cold War proxy campaigns – Syria, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and so on. And he was the popular holder of the exclusive title “Hero of the Republic of Cuba”, Cuba’s highest award. He used to be cheered in the streets. Wrapping up Cuito Cuanavale was another typical Cold War story of deceit. The Cuban allies were decisively thrashed in the east at the Lomba. And the strategic Cuban manoeuvre in the west ended in disaster for them – their last military hoo-ha of the Cold War in Africa. But that’s what I claim, so to help you to make up your mind, let’s see what the other experts found.

    Bridgland, in his book The War for Africa: “[Castro]… tried to dress up political, economic and military failures in Angola as glorious triumphs… Cubans will surely someday trample his grave and destroy the monuments erected to him…” [6]Freelancer Fred Bridgland is an expert on military aspects of the Cold War in Africa. He called his book on the Cuban intervention in Angola “the unofficial story of the war through the eyes of the men who fought it, not those of generals and politicians hundreds of kilometres from the blood, sweat and dust.” He “… pieced together the course of the war for Africa through scores of interviews with the fighting men.” He boasts there were no interference from the military or government, and no censorship. Heitman, in his book War in Angola: “The defeat inflicted on the Fapla (MPLA) forces… was so crushing that it changed the strategic situation beyond recognition.” Heitman is a professional writer on military affairs and correspondent of the Jane’s Defence Weekly. Renwick, in his book Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa: “Stopping the massive Soviet- and Cuban-backed advance in October 1987 required some quite heroic actions by 32 Battalion and the other heavily outnumbered South African forces involved… The South African force never exceeded a brigade in size… Huge quantities of Soviet equipment were destroyed or captured… a most impressive military exploit.” Super diplomat and erstwhile British ambassador to South Africa, Sir Robin Renwick, had intimate knowledge of the big five Western powers that concerned themselves with the region, and painstakingly followed events in Southern Africa. In his book, High Noon in Southern Africa, Crocker, US assistant secretary of state for Africa, poses the question: “The Soviets and Angolans… had been thoroughly defeated. How, then, did the fighting at Cuito become a heroic Cuban legend?” He answers his own question, “By proclaiming to a credulous world (and South African red PCs) that the town of Cuito Cuanavale… was the ‘prize’ over which the entire campaign was fought, and then by crowing when you have managed not to lose it… the South Africans were no match for Castro in the battle of perceptions.”

    US assistant secretary of state for Africa and peace negotiator Chester Crocker was the one person who knew more than anyone else about the political/military scene, including the goals and objectives, strategies and tactics, decision-making processes, and the likes and dislikes of all the role players – the Soviets, the big five Western powers, the Angolans, South Africans, Cubans, the lot. He had full use of state-of-the-art satellite photo surveillance. He published a voluminous book, High Noon in Southern Africa – Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. And there was Simon Barber with “Fidel’s fight not to lose face – Castro explains why Angola lost the battle against SADF”. He said “… the ‘heroic’ defence of Cuito was therefore a vainglorious fraud, designed to cover a retreat that had already been decided.”Southern African statesmen were well informed. Soon after the crushing defeat of the Cuban/Angolans, Southern Africa’s so-called front-line state presidents of that time encouraged the ANC to enter into negotiations with the South African government.

    The Ultimate Conclusion

    The last question is: What did the popular General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez say about Cuito Cuanavale? He didn’t say anything. In 1989, after Cuito Cuanavale, this national hero of the Republic of Cuba was executed by firing squad – he was dead. The Cuban air force commander in Angola couldn’t be executed. General Rafael Del Pino Diaz, who, like Ochoa Sanchez had fought side by side with Castro, had defected to the US during 1987.

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    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    The other side of events

    The other side of the facts

    Turningpoint at Cuito Cuanavale (Ronnie Kasrils)

    By understanding what transpiredat the small town of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, and the impact it had on thepolitical and military balance of forces in Southern Africa, it is possible tosee why the battle stands out as a turning point in our history, writes RonnieKasrils.When Jorge Risquet, one of FidelCastro's shrewdest and most trusted colleagues, addressed the Seventh Congressof the South African Communist Party (SACP), hosted in Cuba in April 1989, hewas greeted with the resounding salutation "Viva Cuito Cuanavale!"For the South African delegates, many from military duty in Angola itself,there was no doubt whatsoever that an epic victory had been won over theapartheid military machine in that embattled country the previous year,constituting a historic turning point in the struggle for liberation. WhenRisquet quoted Castro's assertion that "the history of Africa will bewritten as before and after Cuito Cuanavale," he brought the house down.

    While the generals and punditsof the former South African Defence Force (SADF) are at pains to claim victory1the acid test is to consider the outcome. The SADF, which had carried outcontinuous invasions and incursions into Angola since that country's hard-wonindependence in 1975 (which was the reason for the Cuban military presence inthe first place), had been forced to totally withdraw; the independence ofNamibia was soon to be agreed; the prospect for South African freedom had neverbeen more promising.Before the commencement of thebattle for Cuito Cuanavale in October 1987 the apartheid regime was implacablyopposed to any of those options. While the post-Cuito negotiations also agreedon Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, and relocation of ANC military camps(which went to Uganda), this was no setback compared to the enormity of thestrategic gains. In commemorating the 20th anniversary of the battle this yearand the historic outcome that changed the face of southern Africa - accordingto Nelson Mandela "a turning point for the liberation of our continent andmy people"2- it is necessary to clarify what exactly transpired.It is a paradox that a placewhere Southern Africa's history dramatically turned should be so well off thebeaten track. Cuito Cuanavale is a minor town near the confluence of two riversthat constitute its name, set in the remote, bushy and featureless expanse ofsoutheast Angola, a region the Portuguese referred to as the Land at the End ofthe Earth.

    The prelude to the battlestarted in July 1987 when Angolan government forces (Fapla) attempted toadvance on Jonas Savimbi's Unita strongholds at Mavinga, the strategic key tohis base at Jamba near the Caprivi Strip. With Pretoria's assistance in thesouth and Mobutu's help from Zaire, Unita had grown stronger over the years andits actions had spread to the north, central and eastern parts of Angola. Itwas believed that a direct attack against Savimbi's southeastern headquarterswould most disrupt him, but this was contrary to Cuban advice.At first the offensiveprogressed well, with a battle-hardened and superbly equipped Fapla gaining theupper hand, inflicting heavy casualties on Unita, driving them south towardsMavinga, some 150 kilometres distant. Then in October, Fapla's advancing 47thBrigade, at the Lomba River, 40 kilometres south-east of Cuito, was all butdestroyed in a surprise attack by SADF forces hastening to Unita's rescue.Catastrophe followed as several other Fapla brigades, sustaining heavycasualties wilted under overwhelming ground and air bombardment but managed toretreat to Cuito. The situation could not have been graver. Cuito could havebeen overrun then and there by the SADF, changing the strategic situationovernight. The interior of the country would have been opened up to dominationby Unita with Angola being split in half. This was something Pretoria andSavimbi had been aiming at for years. But the SADF failed to seize theinitiative. This allowed an initial contingent of 120 Cuban troops to rush tothe town from Menongue, 150 kilometres to the north-west and help Faplaorganise the defences. As the ferocious siege developed, Pretoria's generalsand western diplomats confidently predicted Cuito's imminent fall.

    The SADF's objectiveI have had the opportunity tohear the views from both Fidel Castro on the one hand, and General KatLiebenberg, South African army chief, on the other. The briefing from Castrotook place in Havana's Defence Ministry at the end of 1988. He pointed out on ahuge tabletop sand model of southern Angola the drama that had unfolded. Ourdelegation headed by Joe Slovo hung on his every word. The SADF was far toocautious and missed a remarkable opportunity, Castro observed. After theirsuccess on the Lomba they could have quickly taken the town.3According to General Liebenberg,with whom I later established a convivial relationship, the SADF's main aimapart from stopping Fapla's advance, was to keep the town under constantbombardment to prevent its airstrip from being used. He politely stuck to theconventional SADF face-saving explanation for he well knew that if Cuito hadbeen taken Unita would have been placed in a most advantageous position. Butadmitting that meant they had failed in their objective.

    The actions of the SADF areclear evidence of their determination to break through to the town. For sixmonths they threw everything they had at the beleaguered outpost, in their desireto seize the prize. They relentlessly pounded Cuito with sixteen massive 155mmG-5 and G-6 (self-propelled) guns and staged attack after attack led by thecrack 61st mechanised battalion, 32 Buffalo battalion (actually two battalionswith its own armour and artillery units), and later 4th SA Infantry group.These units operated as a powerful ad-hoc brigade. The Fapla defenders doggedlyheld out, reinforced by 1,500 elite troops that arrived from Cuba in December.By 23 March 1988, the last major attack on Cuito was "brought to agrinding and definite halt", in the words of 32 Battalion commander,Colonel Jan Breytenbach.4He writes: "the Unita soldiers did a lot of dying that day" and"the full weight of Fapla's defensive fire was brought down on the headsof [SADF] Regiment President Steyn and the already bleeding Unita." TheSADF prided themselves on a minimal loss of life. That was because they used blackinfantry troops such as their Unita proxy and SWATF (in Namibia) as cannonfodder while the white troops brought-up the rear from the safety of armouredvehicles and tanks. The SADF deployed upwards of 5,000 men at Cuito alone,according to their commander-in-chief, General Jan Geldenhuys,5but this could possibly have been as much as 6,000 men.6In addition there were several thousand Unita troops involved. They wererepulsed by the Cubans and 6,000 determined Fapla defenders.The numerous pro-SADF accountsfocus on the engagements leading up to Cuito, and the siege itself,meticulously recorded battlefield manoeuvres and achievements. Indeed theydescribe tactical efficiency and resourcefulness, but cannot conceal the factthat they failed to conquer the town, and they play down the later decisivemilitary developments on the Namibian border that commenced in April 1988 andpeaked in June. Colonel Breytenbach is the exception here. He observed:"With a lack of foresight the South Africans had allowed the bulk of theiravailable combat power to be tied down on the Cuito Cuanavale front." Inhis view this should have been regarded as a secondary front. This was in sharpcontrast to General Geldenhuys fixating on the pretence of a SADF victory atCuito and lamely claiming that the new front opened up by the Cubans in thewest was akin to Castro "kicking the ball into touch" as though thatpart of southern Angola was outside the field of play in the Atlantic Ocean.His actual words were: "Our opponents boast that they had beat us...because they won some line outs."7The saga at Cuito Cuanavale can be correctly characterised as a Cuban-Angolandefensive victory. Undoubtedly wars are not won by defensive engagements.

    The significance of Cuito isthat the defenders not only saved the day, but also bought the time to enablethe Cuban-Angolan side to turn the tables and by April launch a breathtakingoffensive in the southwest that changed the course of our history. GeneralGeldenhuys knew very well, like a rugby captain suddenly forced onto thedefensive, that the ball was very much in play and his opponents were robustlydriving forward having gained the initiative. In fact stopping the SADF in itstracks at Cuito and then decisively seizing the initiative and going on theoffensive was similar to the great turning point in the Second World War, whenthe Nazi forces were halted at Stalingrad at the end of 1942 and subsequentlydriven back to Berlin.Lest there be any lingeringdoubt about the outcome at Cuito Cuanavale, listen to what the United StatesJoint Chiefs of Staff, closely monitoring events in Angola, noted in anintelligence report dated 15 April 1988 that Cuito Cuanavale was no longer anisolated outpost. Cuban troops had secured the road from Menongue to Cuito."Any SADF/Unita attempt to cut off the main supply route would be met withvery heavy resistance." Cuban planes and anti-aircraft weapons hadreversed the situation for the South African forces arrayed against Cuito: theabsence of the SA airforce in the area had become "notable". Thejoint chiefs further observed: "Lacking air superiority, the SADF wasunable to conduct an air resupply effort resulting in less responsive resupplyeffort over land."8At his tabletop model Castropointed out the amazing feat of a 10,000 strong Cuban, Fapla and South WestAfrica People's Organisation (Swapo) troop deployment, along a front stretchingfrom Angola's southern port of Namibe in the west along the railway line,through Lubango on to Menongue and Cuito in the east. The SADF forces at Cuitowere sidelined, like a major piece on a chess board that has prematurelyadvanced, as powerful armed forces with the latest Soviet weaponry, movedforwards in the south west, under superior air cover, towards the Namibianborder. Angola's Cunene and Mocamedes provinces were liberated after years ofSADF control.A master stroke was the rapidconstruction of airstrips at Cahama and Xangongo near the border, which broughtthe strategic Ruacana and Calueque hydro-electric dam systems on the CuneneRiver within striking distance. Soviet Mig-23s had demonstratedtheir superiority over South Africa's aged Mirage fighters and now that theycommanded the skies the network of SADF bases in northern Namibia was at theirmercy.

    A powerful right blowCastro showed quiet pride inthis achievement, cutting a thoughtful figure. Behind the singular achievementwas outstanding military acumen and not a foolhardy gambler depicted by hisdetractors, including Greg Mills in a recent Sunday Independent article.9It was at this point that he used his now famous boxing analogy to explain thecarefully formulated strategy: Cuito Cuanavale in the east represented theboxer's defensive left fist that blocks the blow, while in the west thepowerful right fist had struck -placing the SADF in a perilous position.10To return to that other sporting metaphor misused by Geldenhuys, play swungrobustly from the east-end of the rugby field to the west-end with the Cubans,Fapla and Swapo on the attack and the SADF uncomfortably pinned back on theborderline.The end for the SADF wassignalled on 27 June 1988. A squadron of Migs bombed the Ruacana and Caluequeinstallations, cutting the water supply to Ovamboland and its military basesand killing 11 young South African conscripts. A Mig-23 executed a neat victoryroll over Ruacana on the Namibian side of the border. The war was effectivelyover.The SADF was clearly out-foxedin Angola. Magnus Malan, South Africa's Minister of Defence, had admitted that"as far as the Defence Force was concerned [Fidel Castro] was an unknownpresence in military terms, and therefore it was difficult to predict hisintentions."11This amounted to an astonishing intelligence failure coming a dozen years afterthe SADF first encountered the Cubans in Angola. Malan was not alone in thisignorance, however, for the Americans had been in confrontation with Havanasince the 1960s and appeared to know no better. Along with Pretoria theyexpected a Soviet Union eager for rapprochement with the West to curtail Cuba'sactions. They were surprised to discover that the Soviet Union's so-calledproxy had not even consulted Moscow over Havana's massive intervention. Theywere even more taken aback when sophisticated Soviet military equipment wasrushed from the USSR to Angola to supply the Cuban-Angolan offensive.The Cubans could have marchedinto Namibia but exercised restraint, with all parties, including the USA andSoviet Union, looking for compromise and a way forward in negotiations that hadpreviously been going nowhere. Castro was not looking for a bloody encounter,which would have cost many lives on both sides. Neither were apartheid'sgenerals and political leaders. They could afford casualties even less than theCubans, considering the popular mass struggle and growing armed actions withinNamibia and South Africa and the serious problem with white conscription.Chester Crocker, America's chiefnegotiator, had to be given a special exemption to meet with the Cubandelegation owing to the United States embargo of that country. Crocker, whosecountry had long supported Unita and earlier Holden Roberto's FLNA against theMPLA, was to confide: "Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. Theyare prepared for both war and peace. We witness considerable tactical finesseand genuinely creative moves at the table."12

    Confused strategyHis opinion of the SouthAfricans was that "they confused military power with nationalstrategy." In his book "High Noon in Southern Africa", about theconflict and the negotiations, Crocker writes: "...a former academiccolleague confirmed my impressions. After spending ten days with Pretoria'smilitary, diplomatic, and intelligence establishment, he reported to me that hehad seldom seen a government so utterly confused and at cross-purposes overbasic questions of policy. Given the absence of strategic guidance from toppolitical levels, it was remarkable that SADF chief of staff Jannie Geldenhuysand his military colleagues avoided disaster in Angola during the first half of1988."The central negotiation issuewas UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, concerning South Africa'swithdrawal from Namibia, and that country's independence. Linked to this wasthe departure of Cuban troops from Angola. The last SADF soldier leftAngola at the end of August 1988, and Namibia became independent in March 1990,even before the Cuban exodus from Angola.

    Apartheid Foreign Minister, PikBotha, had tried to modify Resolution 435, asserting that the SADF wouldwithdraw from Angola only "if Russia and its proxies did the same".They made no mention of even considering a withdrawal from Namibia. BusinessDay reported on 16 March 1988 that Pretoria was "offering to withdraw intoNamibia - not from Namibia - in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces fromAngola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving upthe territory any time soon."These attempts, however, provedfutile in the face of the changed balance of forces and were demolished byJorge Risquet who gave Pik Botha a roasting: "The time for your militaryadventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, foryour massacres of refugees...is over," he chided. He said Pretoria wasbehaving as though it was "a victorious army, rather than what it reallyis: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing... South Africa must face the factthat it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve onthe battlefield." What materialised at Cuito Cuanavale set in chain aprocess that finally broke the ascendancy of the military hawks and politiciansin Pretoria. Together with the strugglewithin South Africa, and apartheid's international isolation, the country'sfreedom was soon achieved. It is fitting that at Freedom Park, outsidePretoria, the 2,070 names of Cuban soldiers who fell in Angola between 1975 and1988, are inscribed along with the names of South Africans who died during theliberation struggle. Those patriots and internationalists were motivated by asingle goal - an end to racial rule and genuine African independence. After thirteenyears defending Angolan sovereignty the Cubans took nothing home except thebones of their fallen and our gratitude.

    It is also noteworthy that formost of those years Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) combatants engaged the adversary inmany parts of Angola, cooperated with Fapla and Swapo units, as well as withCuban and Soviet advisers, aided in the interception and translation ofAfrikaans radio traffic, and provided invaluable intelligence on the SADF. Onehundred-and-thirty MK combatants and a number of SADF members lost their livesin action during that time.Tens of thousands of Africanswere killed by South Africa's murderous security forces in Angola andMozambique where they waged almost continuous dirty wars against those newlyliberated countries, and in bloody massacres of civilians, refugees and freedomfighters in such places as Cassinga, Gaberone, Maseru, Manzini, Matola andelsewhere, in the desperate attempt to save white supremacy and prevent thefuture being born.The die-hard officers of theformer SADF and apartheid politicians of the time try to claim they werefighting to save Southern Africa from communism, but that was a myth to curryfavour with the West during the Cold War. The era of racist, colonial rule theystrove to perpetuate has thankfully passed into history. All the states of ourregion are enjoying peace and stability and getting on with the developmentaltasks of creating a better life for their people now that apartheid is no more.Castro's prediction that Africa's history would radically change after thebattle for Cuito Cuanavale has been borne out. It is imperative that ourpeople, and particularly the younger generation, be made aware of Cuba'sremarkable sacrifice and contribution to Africa's freedom and independence, andthe heroic role of the independent states of our region.RONNIE KASRILS is a formermember of the ANC National Executive Committee, Minister for IntelligenceServices, and was former chief of intelligence in Umkhonto we Sizwe.******************************************** ****************************************
    CUITO CUANAVALE – THE FINAL MILITARY DEFEAT OF WHITE SUPREMACY INAFRICA.
    The battle for Cuito Cuanavalein South Eastern Angola may be considered as the final battle in Africa’s longstruggle against colonialism and imperialism. The battle for Cuito Cuanavalewas the last in Angola’s long war to rid itself of the destabilisation andpartial occupation by Apartheid South Africa and the US sponsored terroristorganisation UNITA.

    Cuito is a small place, perhapstwo or three streets big, yet it stood against the full might of the ApartheidArmy (SADF) and its proxy terrorist organisation UNITA. Ronald Reagan had hopedthat the defeat of Cuito would represent a mortal blow to the “evil empire” ofthe Soviet Union, and that it would allow UNITA to take control of the entireWestern half of Angola.The intention was that UNITAwould move its capital from Jamba in South Eastern Angola to Quimbele in theNorth East, where Reagan could more openly support UNITA, hoping that it wouldbolster the dictatorial regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now DemocraticRepublic of the Congo).The halting of UNITA, the SouthAfrican Defence Force, and the South West African Territorial Force at Cuitomeant that the designs of the Apartheid regime and the South African rulingclass for Namibia and Angola could never be realised. It also meant that SouthAfrica itself was forced by the circumstance of a major military set back tobegin negotiations for a transition to democracy inside South Africa itself.The battle for Cuito Cuanavalestarted in May 1984 and continued until the attack on the Tumpo area whichresulted in massive losses for the SADF of both equipment and manpower in March1988. In scale the battle has been compared to the tank battle of El Alamein inthe 2nd World War.At least 15 South Africanfighter planes were shot down between November 1987 and January 1988, 230 SADFsoldiers died between September and October 1987. By March 1988 a further 400plus had been killed. South Africa had lost air superiority, and Cuito hadbecome a quagmire.Lacking in any transparency boththe South African generals and the politicians were consistently lying to thepublic in general and parents of conscripts in particular about events inAngola.Peace talks started immediatelyafter in July 1988 and ended in South Africa’s withdrawal from Angola, andNamibia [with that country gaining it’s full independence by 1990] and theprocess of a negotiated settlement in South Africa with the first democraticelections being held in 1994.What made Cuito so important?The rural area around Cuito is one of the most fertile in the whole of Africa.It is also well watered. It therefore has the potential of being the breadbasket not only of Angola but also for the whole of Africa. Yet Cuito remainsone of the most densely land-mined areas in the world, making agricultureimpossible. South Africa was the biggest producer of land-mines in the world inthe 1980s.The entire Cuando Kubango areais also very rich in diamonds. The area South of Cuito to the Namibian borderwas under the control of Savimbi’s UNITA. UNITA was lavishly funded by DeBeers. Savimbi paid for his insatiable appetite for violence with diamonds andivory.De Beers turned Angola’sdiamonds into landmines and bombs, much as the oil companies tuned its oil intorivers of blood.The diamonds and ivory weresmuggled out of Angola in the supply helicopters of the SADF. The entireelephant population of Southern Angola was wiped out in this manner.

    The forces of right wingreaction ranged against the small town of Cuito therefore included the classinterests of the South African mining magnates, the imperial interests of theUSA and the sub-imperial interests of the Afrikaner faction of the raciallydefined ruling class of South Africa.The victims of these aggressiveinterests included the Angolan people in general and those of Cuito inparticular. Angola has the highest number of landmine amputees per capita inthe world and Cuito remains the most densely mined area in the world. Othervictims included the national service men press ganged into the SADF at thetime. It is alleged that the remains of many of these servicemen remain on thebattlefield at Tumpo. The SADFs retreat in March 1988 was in such disarray thatboth equipment and casualties were abandoned.Yet despite this defeat thepropaganda machine of the Apartheid regime never admitted ignominy in thebattles of 1975/76 which saw them kicked out of most of Angola, or the battleson 1988 which saw the end of the SADF’s presence in Southern Angola andNamibia.The propagandists of the oldorder, Peter Stiff, Paul Els, A.J. Venter, Alan Rake and their ilk contend tothis day that the Apartheid regime did not lose the war on the battlefield, butthat they lost it around the negotiation table.The question remains, how werethey forced to the negotiation table given their assumed invincibility?Hopefully, with Angola’s reconstruction, now that there is peace, historianswill be able to visit Cuito and help with the reconstruction of the glorioushistory of resistance by its people.Although all the generals of theSADF, including Viljoen, Breytenbach, Malan, Geldenhuys and Neil Barnard wereall given amnesty, they never made a full disclosure.
    In failing to reveal the fulltruth to the people of South Africa, Angola and Namibia, they also failed toreveal the full truth to the white parents of national service men who were tooyoung to vote in the racial Apartheid elections, yet old enough to die in itssenseless wars. It is time that we know the truth, for without it there can beno healing.

    The North West Province is hometo the remnants of 32 Battalion located at Pomfret. This was the mostnotoriously brutal fighting unit of the SADF in Angola in the 1980s. The NorthWest Province has an obligation to the people of Angola in general and Cuito inparticular to realise the vision of former Premier Popo Molefe of areconstruction and development air bridge into Southern Angola. Will the NorthWest Province ever live up to this vision?

  8. #18

    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    I was at the Lomba river battles in September- October 1987, moving closer to Cuito-Cuanavale in November -December 1987 for some battles and skirmishes at the Vimpulo, Mianei and Chambinga rivers. I was not in a fighting role, just a lowly medic putting up drips and bandages for our our men. I know what it feels like to be shot at and bombed though.
    That doesn't necessarily make my opinions worth much, but of course I am following the discussions with interest.

    First: the so-called "Battle of Cuito-Cuanavale" there never was such a battle. My definition of a battle is : "An engagement between opposing military forces at a specific time and place." Some battles can loosely be tied together, if they happened in the same area, between the same opponents, and over a certain time span, and called a "campaign". A "war" would be all the battles and campaigns together, and usually has a beginning and an end, though the former is usually in retrospect and the latter seems unobtainable during the war. To call the "Battle of CC" spanning 3 years, as Kasrils does, is historically inaccurate. He could maybe call it "the Campaign around CC" or the "Campaign to liberate Jamba".

    Let me also tell you that in real battle, not one of the soldiers can have a full view and understanding of how the battle is progressing. Two soldiers might be in the same battle in different locations and have opposite views on n their side's success or failure. At the Battle of Chisseque on 13 September 1987, I was in such a position. I saw 7 of our men burn to death in a shot out Ratel. My ambulance was narrowly missed by a shell from a tank, though I saw that same tank explode shortly afterwards from a brave shot delivered by a 90 mm cannon mounted on a Ratel. I saw some corpses lying around, but from the seven men we lost, I concluded that we were not doing well at all. The next day only did I learn from some of our men that we killed about 300 of the enemy, destroyed three tanks and sent the rest fleeing back across the Lomba.

  9. #19

    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    When I read the two opinions by Geldenhuys and Kasrils, the obvious conclusion is that there is a lot of propaganda on both sides. Kasrils opinion that they killed at least 630 SADF soldiers in a 5 month period is ridiculous, as is the 15 fighter planes shot down. The "mere" 7 men killed on 13 September was the direct cause of the SA government having to admit to fighting in Angola. They could not explain that number away as "Somewhere in the Operational Area" as they could when losing smaller numbers of soldiers at a time. If seven men were such a big deal, how would they explain 630? Remember each of those men had families. How would they hide the loss?

    But, I am falling into the same trap, of playing the numbers game. The Americans won the numbers game in Vietnam, but still lost Saigon.
    Geldenhuys, also plays the numbers game, and Kasrils even tries to beat him at it, but with such blatant lies, that it is laughable.

    Unfortunately, two inconvenient truths are exposed by Geldenhuys' reasoning:

    When quoting the true figure of the astonishingly low losses of SADF troops, he conveniently forgets to count all the UNITA dead, as well as SWATF members. It would be more honest to include them in our losses. But then the numbers would be less impressive.

    The other obvious truth, is that the enemy did outflank us with their thrust towards Owamboland in the west. If you view the war in its totality, Kasrils is right that SA was forced to eventually withdraw from SWA by the threat of a major war on SWA soil. I know we could probably have won that war, but at a cost in lives, expense and votes that the SA government could not afford.
    The real elephant in the room, is the final outcome of the Political-military war. In the end, SA withdrew from SWA, and the enemy came to power in Windhoek. What happened to SA itself is a story for another day.

    Having said all that, I want say clearly that I don't think the fighting was all in vain. The communists were held off untill their international power had waned. If the ANC came to power in 1963, during the Rivonia conspiracy, SA would have been no different from the Belgian Congo. Mandela 1994 was different from Mandela 1963.

  10. #20

    Default Re: Cuito Cuanavale (BBC 4) - 18min

    I cannot understand why General Geldenhuys says that the enemy tried repeatedly to cross the Lomba at the same place. On 9 Sept, they tried to cross at a place where a small tributary joins the Lomba from the south (our side) I don't know the name of the tributary. There we shot out a BTR (armoured personell carrier) and a mobile bridge on the 9th.

    On the 10th of Sept they tried to cross at a place about 2 km east of the wreck of their mobile bridge. That is where we shot out their tanks with the new ZT 3 anti tank missile. On that morning, they already had a lot of infantry on our side who had crossed during the night.
    These two attempted crossings can be regarded as the same place.

    On the 13th we clashed at another attempted crossing where the Chisseque river joins the Lomba from the south. This is quite far from our battle sites of the 9th and 10th I estimate about 10 to 20 km west. It is extremely difficult to judge distance when bundu bashing at night with a huge armoured ambulance truck.

    On (I think about) 27 Sept battle group Charlie (the other battle group, I was in battle group Bravo) clashed at another attempted crossing even further west. This is where the huge haul of vehicles, including tanks and a SAM8 system was made. This attempted crossing was even further west.

    This was their last attempt before the retreat back to CC.

    Definately three different places of the attempted river crossings.

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